Special Standing Committee

[Mr. Jimmy Hood in the Chair]

Adoption and Children Bill

Jimmy Hood: At its sitting on Tuesday afternoon, the Committee had completed consideration of clause 105. Under the programme resolution, the next item to be considered is clause 63, to which no amendments have been tabled.
 Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64 - Status conferred by adoption

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move amendment No. 97, in page 36, line 24, leave out
'as if the person had been born'.

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 126, in page 36, line 24, leave out 'had been born as' and insert 'was'.
 No. 127, in page 36, line 28, leave out 'had been born as' and insert 'was'. 
 No. 128, in page 36, line 31, leave out 'had been' and insert 'was'.

Henry Bellingham: Amendment No. 97 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton); the other amendments are in my name. I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to consider the wording of subsection (1)(a). It uses the phrase
''as if the person''— 
that is the adopted child— 
''had been born as a child of the marriage''. 
The phrase is used again in paragraph (b). I find that slightly insulting. I would be grateful if the Government were to reflect on that terminology, because it will be particularly upsetting to birth mothers. We have spent much time debating the question of birth mothers, and the answer seems very simple: only the birth mother can give birth to the adoptee. Children cannot be ''as if born to''; they are ''born of'' someone. It is not good drafting, and I see no advantage in it. I accept that there may be complicated legal reasons for using that turn of phrase, but I would be grateful if the Parliamentary Secretary gave us an explanation. 
 Under clause 68, we shall debate the question of adopted children inheriting titles; that provision would make the phrase in clause 64(1) incongruous. Furthermore, we should consider single people who adopt. We had an interesting debate about that subject only last week. The phrase 
''as if the person had been born as a child of the marriage'' 
will attract substantial ridicule if it means single people having to pretend that they are married to a non-existent person in order to be seen as the parent of an adoptee. I feel strongly about this. We have debated adoption by single people and by single people with partners, yet the Bill talks specifically of marriage and uses the phrase ''as if born to''. 
 My submission is simple: we need to remove the phrase. The Bill should be amended in the manner suggested. I would be grateful to hear the Parliamentary Secretary's comments. I hope that she will agree that we could word the clause a great deal more appropriately. We could prevent it from attracting ridicule and insulting birth mothers and single people.

Hilton Dawson: The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) makes a sensible point. I can only assume that the wording in the clause is the manifestation of a technical problem. The words
''as if the person had been born as a child of the marriage'' 
invite fiction, but everything that we have done so far has been about encouraging clarity, good information and honesty in relationships. Adoption is not about pretending that someone was born as a child of the marriage, but about people taking parental responsibility for a child and looking after him to the best of their ability—as though he were one of their children. 
 I cannot imagine that the amendment will cause huge dissent. I can only think that the Parliamentary Secretary will say that a difficult technical problem prevents us from sensibly rearranging the wording of the clause. I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I hope that we can change the wording.

Tim Loughton: I apologise for being slightly late, and I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Hood.
 I want briefly to reiterate the words of my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk. It would be common sense and a courtesy to those involved in adoption for us not to continue with the fiction of changing the birth details of those who are adopted by new adoptive parents. The Parliamentary Secretary will no doubt tell us that the wording must take its present form to reflect the drafting of earlier legislation or other aspects of the law. If so, it is time that we changed the law in general. It is no excuse to say that we must perpetuate provisions such as that in paragraph (a), which is patently an anachronism. I hope that we shall continue the successful trend of getting the Government to see sense and respond favourably to Opposition amendments.

Julian Brazier: I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Hood.
 We do not want to spend a lot of time on a small drafting point. None the less, my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk made an eloquent case for improving it. I am grateful for the support of the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson). 
 I want to add one small parallel. My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) expressed concern about other pieces of legislation being used to justify the wording of the clause, and I suspect that the Parliamentary Secretary will touch on that. A similar justification was employed for about a generation for the use of the word ''defective'' to describe people with learning difficulties. That phrase was grossly offensive. The wording in the clause is not as offensive, but it is unnecessary, as my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk said. It is a little piece of fiction that we could do without. I look forward to the Parliamentary Secretary replying constructively.

Rosie Winterton: I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Hood. It is a delight to see you.
 In a spirit of co-operation, I should say that the Government have some sympathy with the spirit of the amendments. There is obviously concern on both sides of the Committee. 
 The clause will determine the status of an adopted child, so that it is clear how he will be treated in law. That is consistent with the general principle of chapter 4, which is that a child ceases in law to be a member of his birth family and becomes a member of his adoptive family on the making of an adoption order. When a married couple adopts a child, he is to be treated in legal terms as though he had been born as a child of the marriage of that couple. When a child is adopted by a step-parent, he is to be treated in law as though he had been born as a child of the marriage of the step-parent and the parent to whom that person is married. 
 The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk asked about single people. When a child is adopted by a single person, he is to be treated in law as though he had been born to that person in marriage, but not as the child of any actual marriage of the adopter. The provisions of chapter 4 provide for how an adopted child is to be treated in law for purposes of inheritance, pensions and insurance. They do not touch on the biological or emotional ties of an adopted child—nor are they intended to do so. 
 Adopted children have always been regarded as legitimate. The declaration in section 39 of the Adoption Act 1976 that an adopted child is not illegitimate will not be re-enacted by the clause. The relevant provision of the clause is drafted to ensure that an adopted child is not treated in law as illegitimate. It is therefore implicit from the other provisions of the clause that that is the case.

Elfyn Llwyd: I raised an issue with the Minister of State, Department of Health, the hon. Member for Redditch (Jacqui Smith), and I am still waiting for a reply, so I shall ask the Parliamentary Secretary about it.
 Imagine that adopter A adopts child B and lives with co-habitee C. Adopter A leaves a will in favour of her partner, C, and dies. If C died intestate soon after, would I be right in thinking that the child would not have any inheritance? I am not trying to trip up the Parliamentary Secretary, as that would not be right, and I do not expect a reply now. If I am wrong, I will stand corrected.

Rosie Winterton: I thank the hon. Gentleman for the question, to which I understand that my hon. Friend the Minister will reply.
 I understand the concern about the wording of the provisions and the idea that the Bill creates the fiction that the child was born to the adopters, almost airbrushing the birth parents out of the adopted child's life. Some people have understood the provision to imply almost that a child's emotional ties with his or her birth parents can be severed, along with legal ones. I assure all members of the Committee that the Government have no wish to cause distress either to birth parents or adopted children. The clause is essential to protect the rights of adopted children. 
 The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk has clearly put considerable effort into drafting his amendments to try to ensure that the relevant legal status remains, but they are defective. Although they would provide for a child to be regarded as a child of the marriage—as legitimate—the omission of the word ''born'' would mean that the child could not be regarded as the natural child of one or both parents. Being a natural child matters in legal terms, in respect of inheritance, parental rights and responsibilities. For example, being regarded as the natural child is the key to an adoptive child's right to inherit under intestacy law. That might be relevant to the point that the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) made. 
 The Government undertook during evidence-taking sittings to re-examine the wording of the clause, to see whether we could improve on it. I assure hon. Members that we have tried to find an alternative but have so far been unsuccessful. The technical deficiencies in the amendments mean that we cannot accept them. We are quite prepared to continue to search for a more acceptable wording, but I am not very optimistic about the prospects of finding such wording. We must ensure that the adopted child is legally protected. I stress that our stance is not an attempt to offend birth parents. However, despite trying hard, we have not been able to arrive at a better wording. 
 I hope that, in view of our intention to continue to consider the matter, the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for her reply. I understand her logic exactly. However, I have some suggestions. The first relates to property rights. Inheritance rights might be an issue—property might be entailed—or other rights under intestacy law might be involved, but surely it would be simple to draft another subsection to prevent the rights of adopted children in those matters being compromised or jeopardised. Such a provision in the Bill would surely override other law, or operate alongside it. If the Parliamentary Secretary's legal advisers tell her that it would not be acceptable to the courts to put those rights of adoptive children in the Bill, perhaps other legislation should be changed. If the background inheritance and intestacy law is relevant, surely we can change it in statute.
 I take on board the Parliamentary Secretary's point about single people who adopt and the way in which the rights of children of those adopters need to be protected. Putting that to one side, we could still leave out the phrase 
''if the person had been born'' 
so that the clause would read: 
 ''An adopted person is to be treated in law . . . where the adopters are a married couple, as a child of the marriage''. 
We could then insert a subsection to protect children's rights with respect to inheritance and intestacy. Will the Parliamentary Secretary comment on that specific recommendation? Could we return to the matter on Report, after she has discussed it with the Lord Chancellor and other legal brains?

Rosie Winterton: It would be unwise for me to engage in a discussion of what might or might not work. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman appreciates, it is important first to consult our legal advisers and talk to parliamentary counsel about what is possible. I assure the hon. Gentleman that we will continue to search for wording that meets the objectives that we have discussed. It is not that efforts have not been made, but because of certain constraints and the need to protect adopted children in law, we have so far been unable to find anything satisfactory. The hon. Gentleman's comments are on the record and can be examined. I am prepared to write to him about his specific suggestion about inserting another subsection. I hope that, with that assurance, he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Henry Bellingham: I seek one more assurance from the Parliamentary Secretary: we will be able to return to the matter on Report. Sometimes it is difficult to fit everything in on Report, but I understand that if Ministers are keen for a subject to be revisited then, there is a much greater chance of it being debated.

Jimmy Hood: Order. I must tell the hon. Gentleman that what is discussed on Report is a decision for Mr. Speaker and not for the Parliamentary Secretary.

Henry Bellingham: I certainly take that on board.

Jimmy Hood: Do you wish to withdraw the amendment?

Henry Bellingham: I would like to have a further comfort from the Parliamentary Secretary, in my determination to continue to address the issue.

Rosie Winterton: I shall have to take your advice, Mr. Hood. As you said, it depends on the Speaker's ruling. I have said that we will examine the matter and try to find something better. I cannot guarantee that we will find anything better, but I will take on board the hon. Gentleman's suggestions and write to him about the particular suggestion that he has made. It would be foolish to make any commitments about proceedings on Report without first knowing that there was something better.

Henry Bellingham: The Minister has been fair and understanding. In light of her remarks, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 65 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 66 - Rules of interpretation for instruments concerning property

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Henry Bellingham: The clause is fairly complicated, and much of it will be covered in appendices, but what is the situation as regards entailed property? I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary's colleagues in the Box can shed some light on that, although she may know the answer herself.
 Subsection (2) refers to dates of adoption. What is the crucial factor in deciding the inheritance of property that is left to the eldest of two adopted children of a marriage—their dates of birth or the dates on which they were adopted? That would affect not only large inheritances, but the inheritance of, for example, a small, modest house in one of our constituencies. I would be grateful if the Parliamentary Secretary could consider those two points.

Rosie Winterton: I should set out a little of the background to the clause. As the hon. Gentleman said, it sets out the rules of interpretation for any instrument concerning the disposition of property. It puts in place a clear system that endeavours to put the adopted child and any natural children in the adoptive family on as equal a footing as possible in respect of inheritance issues.
 The hon. Gentleman asked what would happen if two or more children had been adopted. Where a disposition depends on the date of birth of a child of an adoptive parent, an adopted person is to be treated as having been born on the date on which the adoption order was made. Where two or more children are adopted on the same date, they will be treated as if they were both born on that date, but in the order of their births. That general principle does not prejudice an interest vested in possession in the adopted child before the adoption or any interest that is expectant on such an interest. 
 The clause assists in the disposition of property where no express position has been made in any legal instrument or will. It is, however, open to any person who leaves property to make their own provision as to how an adopted child should be dealt with. For example, if the adoptive parents die intestate, the adopted child will be able to benefit in the same way as any natural children. 
 The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk spoke of there being two or more children. Where there is a question about who is the eldest, the adopted child will be treated under the clause as having been born on the date of the adoption. A family might have two natural children aged five and three and an adopted child aged seven. For the purpose of any will that specifies that property should go to the eldest child, the five-year-old natural child would inherit the property.

Henry Bellingham: Does the Parliamentary Secretary not feel that that is slightly unfair? We have been talking about inclusion and how such children, when they understand that they are adopted, should nevertheless feel part of the adopted family. We have said all along that they should have exactly the same rights as natural children, yet they do not on this important point.

Rosie Winterton: The hon. Gentleman might quarrel with the clause, but it replaces section 42 of the 1976 Act and follows the system that has been in place since 1976. We should accept that that system has been seen to operate fairly. We have to think about the balance of rights for natural and adopted children. Experience has shown that the previous Act has worked well, so the decision has been made to repeat the provision. I hope that that reassures him.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 67 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 68 - Property devolving with peerages etc.

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move amendment No. 129, in page 38, line 29, leave out 'not'.

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 130, in page 38, line 31, leave out 'not'.

Henry Bellingham: The amendments, put simply, will give adopted children the right to inherit titles and other inherited honours. We have spoken at length about the paramount importance of inclusivity and the integration of adopted children into new families and homes. Adopted children rightly enjoy almost all the same rights as natural children, although we have been considering some important rights under inheritance and intestacy that they do not enjoy.
 We have spoken too about how vital it is for adopted children to have certain rights under inheritance and intestacy law, and a moment ago, the Parliamentary Secretary said that they should have those rights. They have the names of adopted families and many such rights. In terms of esteem and the attitude of families towards the children who are adopted into them, it is essential that they be considered part of such families. That is fundamental.

Kevin Brennan: Do I detect some republican sympathies in the hon. Gentleman's comments? I am sympathetic to the point that he makes about the rights of the adopted child, but would not the clause as amended be a fundamental breach of the hereditary principle—and what would be its effect on the succession to the monarchy?

Henry Bellingham: I shall address that point shortly. The hon. Gentleman raises an important matter. I am no republican—[Interruption.] However, I feel strongly that adopted children should have the same rights as natural children.

Jonathan R Shaw: The hon. Gentleman places the child's welfare and needs at a high level. Does he really believe that becoming the seventh earl of Kinglassie, or wherever, would be as important to a child as having loving parents?

Henry Bellingham: I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman that the most important thing is the love that a family can give the child. In a moment, I shall give an example that illustrates clearly that although the parents may love the adopted child, the child's life may be made more difficult as a result of the state of affairs that we are debating.
 One surprising restriction remains: adopted children cannot inherit titles of honour. For instance, they cannot inherit property—it may not be a large farm but a small house—that is entailed to a title. Furthermore, although it may not interest Labour Members, adopted children cannot use courtesy titles. Labour Members may be 100 per cent. against hereditary peers sitting in the House of Lords, and they may even want to introduce legislation to stop people using titles, although I do not know how one could do that in a democracy.

Jonathan R Shaw: I am fairly ignorant about that aspect of society, but I am curious. Will the hon. Gentleman enlighten the Committee about what he means by courtesy titles?

Henry Bellingham: Yes, indeed; let me explain. If the hon. Gentleman loses his seat at the next election, and the Prime Minister gives him a life peerage as a consolation prize, his children could, if they wanted, call themselves ''the honourable'' followed by their name. If they were adopted children, however, they would not be able to do that. I have always taken the view that, for life peerages, courtesy titles are pretty irrelevant, but the Prime Minister still has the power to create hereditary peerages. In fact, several have been created over the past 20 years or so, including Lord Whitelaw, Viscount Tonypandy and the Earl of Stockton. Obviously, the eldest son of an earl is titled Lord—[Interruption.]

Jimmy Hood: Order. I ask hon. Members on the Government Front Bench to stop conversing with each other while others are engaged in debate.

Henry Bellingham: I hope that we in this country will be using titles for many generations to come, but our priority should be to treat adopted children of such families as fairly and compassionately as possible. Let us imagine what an enormous outcry there would be if adopted children were excluded from other social or even religious groups.

Tim Loughton: Is my hon. Friend aware that one witness who gave evidence on the video provided by the Children's Society to the Committee, which I watched with interest last week, was the adoptive daughter of the Duke of Richmond, from Goodwood in Sussex? She is a fascinating woman from Lesotho in southern Africa. She was brought up in the aristocracy, as she freely called it, in this country, and enjoyed herself immensely, but of course will not be able to inherit any part of the Goodwood estate or any title, even though she has been brought up as the child of the Duke of Richmond.

Henry Bellingham: My hon. Friend is right. The Duke of Richmond and Gordon adopted two daughters, both of African descent. One, Maria, was born in 1959 and is married to Christopher Handy. I think that it was Naomi, who was born in 1962, to whom my hon. Friend referred. She is known as Nimmy March; she is an actress. If they were not adopted, they would be able to call themselves Lady Maria March and Lady Naomi March. They are not allowed to do so because they are adopted. I should have thought that enough stigma is attached to trans-racial adoptions, but adding to it is completely unacceptable.
 The question has been asked how many families are affected by the clause. I have been doing some research and have discovered that 23 peers and 16 baronets have adopted children, so a substantial number of families are affected. Some of the families will be without property, but many will have property, and many of those properties will be entailed with the title, so the potential property rights of a substantial number of adopted children will be removed. 
 I shall give an example, which is relevant to the point made by the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Mr. Shaw) about the importance of the love and affection that a family gives to an adopted child. That is paramount. The fourth Marquess of Aberdeen and his wife adopted a child, who was born in 1950. He is called Andrew David Gordon. Five years later, the Marquess of Aberdeen had a natural son, who is called Alexander George; he also has two adopted daughters. The natural son has the courtesy title of the Earl of Haddo. 
 Labour Members may not like titles or courtesy titles, but I should have thought that the situation would be pretty demeaning and unpleasant for that eldest son, who, to all intents and purposes, is the eldest of four children. He was born to one family and adopted by another. He was given a loving home by a couple who assumed that they would be childless but then had three more children. I am sure that the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford would agree that, whatever the love and affection given by the parents to the eldest child in that situation, it must be difficult for him. We are considering measures to give adopted children every other right, but we are not prepared to give them this one, for archaic and unacceptable reasons.

Kevin Brennan: I am interested by the hon. Gentleman referring to the reasons for the clause as archaic. Will he respond to my points about archaic principles, hereditary principles and the monarchy?

Henry Bellingham: Yes, I shall refer to that now. Adopted children should have the same rights as natural children. We hope that Prince William will eventually succeed to the throne, marry and have children, but let us assume that he has only one child—a son—whom he adopts. It would be outrageous if that son could not, in due course, call himself the Prince of Wales and be the heir to the monarchy. To follow the logic of my argument, my answer to the hon. Gentleman is yes.
 I understand why Labour Members feel that peerages and inherited titles are socially divisive and a relic of the past, irrelevant in this modern society. I do not take that view, but I imagine that many Labour Members do. None the less, I hope that they feel that it would be unwarranted to exclude adopted children.

Jonathan Djanogly: Has my hon. Friend considered giving advice to the Emperor of Japan?

Jimmy Hood: Order. That is not related to the amendment.

Henry Bellingham: This is a very interesting debate, and I shall make a point of sending a copy of Hansard to the Japanese ambassador.

Tim Loughton: I am sure that the ambassador to Japan will read it with great interest. However, let me bring the debate slightly closer to home. My hon. Friend said the overt republicanism displayed by Labour Members was understandable, but is it? The leader of the Labour party, the Prime Minister, has created more hereditary peers who take the Labour Whip in the other place—

Jimmy Hood: Order. The hon. Gentleman is going wide of the mark. His comments are not relevant to the amendment.

Henry Bellingham: My hon. Friend is right. Whatever the Prime Minister says about—

Jimmy Hood: Order. I thought that I had given a little hint about my concern. I suspect that I need not hint any more.

Henry Bellingham: I shall return to my comments on the amendments. There are undoubtedly contradictions in the Labour party's attitude, to which I may return in my concluding remarks.
 Those countering my argument that adopted children should be able to inherit ancient titles, such as dukedoms, earldoms or baronetcies, have made much of the fact that blood offspring should inherit them. However, fundamental changes have taken place. There was a time when political power attached to hereditary peerages, which were part of the legislature. That is still true to an extent, although the Government will, regrettably, put an end to that. Hereditary peerages are now only a small part of the legislature, and the Government intend to remove them completely in phase 2 of their reform of the House of Lords. The constitutional implications of my suggested reform will not be that far-reaching. The hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Kevin Brennan) rightly suggested that it would have far-reaching implications for only one aspect of the constitution—the monarchy. 
 The debate has moved on in another important regard, as my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) will be well aware. In the past, he has spoken at length about in vitro fertilisation treatment and the problems faced by couples who cannot have children. As different aspects of infertility treatment have moved on, the term ''blood offspring'' has become more difficult to define. There are many permutations of infertility treatment. Sometimes, donated sperm may be involved, and a child may be the blood offspring of the mother, but not the father. Sometimes, an egg may be donated, and the father's sperm will be used. Sometimes, both the egg and the sperm are donated, and although born to a mother, the child is not her blood offspring. In America, surrogate mothers have often been used by childless parents. A surrogate mother may give birth to a child that was conceived with donated sperm—an even more complicated situation. 
 My submission is simple. The argument about blood offspring has become confused. There are many forms of assisted conception. The area is complex and technological advances mean that it is moving on apace. Anyone who reads articles by Professor Lord Winston or Professor Ian Craft will know that there will be a huge amount of debate and discussion about this area in future.

Kevin Brennan: I want to probe the hon. Gentleman on the implications of his remarks. Does he think that the adopted child of a person with a hereditary title should take precedence in inheritance over an illegitimate child of that person?

Henry Bellingham: That is a good point. Illegitimate children cannot inherit a title and that should be examined. There is a good example in my constituency, which concerns, Labour Members will be pleased hear, a Labour hereditary peer. Lord Melchett, an old Etonian, former Labour Minister and current executive director of Greenpeace, inherited a large estate in my constituency. I get on with him very well, although we do not have the same political views. His son will not be able to inherit the Melchett title, because he was born out of wedlock. I am sure that Lord Melchett would not mind my mentioning that—it is common knowledge that he has not married his partner. It is scandalous that his son cannot inherit the title—

Jimmy Hood: Order. I ask the hon. Gentleman to return to his amendment. He is moving far away from it.

Henry Bellingham: Only by moving away from the amendment are we able to get to the spirit and flavour of the endeavour. We are trying to break new ground. The amendment will change the law in a small but fundamental way.

Hilton Dawson: Is not the hon. Gentleman being overly modest in asserting that the changes that the amendment would bring about are small? He is breaking with the hereditary principle of the monarchy and with that of the peerage. Is he not dealing a greater blow to the system of inherited privilege and wealth in this country than any Labour Member would have dared to propose?

Henry Bellingham: The hon. Gentleman's point is interesting. The changes are minor in the context of a Bill that will hopefully make adoption much easier for hundreds of thousands of people. As a result of the Bill, many thousands of families will provide loving homes for children. As I said, the proposed changes would at the most affect 50 families. I will shortly draw my remarks to a close, as other Members want to speak.
 It is wrong that children born as a result of egg or sperm donation or, dare I say it, illicit liaisons—or even surreptitious overseas adoptions—should be given more rights than legally adopted children. That is the fundamental point.

Jonathan Djanogly: Has my hon. Friend discussed his amendments with august institutions such as the College of Arms?

Henry Bellingham: I happen to know that such institutions take a fairly neutral view—they can understand both sides of the argument. My hon. Friend's intervention is none the less constructive. If the Parliamentary Secretary were to accept the logic of my arguments and the amendments were made, it would be important to ensure that such organisations were on side, to lessen the chance of the removal of the amendments on the Floor of the House or in another place.
 We ought to put the proposed reform in context. Will the Parliamentary Secretary carefully consider the examples of ancient Greece and ancient Rome, where adoption carried inheritance rights? Subsequent natural children there could never take away adopted children's rights. Gaius Julius, nephew of Julius Caesar, was adopted; he inherited the imperial office and became Augustus Caesar. Labour Members may be familiar with Ovid and with the myth of Hercules, who was adopted by Zeus and Hera. Ovid wrote: 
 ''When Zeus persuaded his jealous wife to adopt Hercules, the goddess got into bed and, clasping the baby hero to her bosom, pushed him through her robes and let him fall to the ground in imitation of real birth''. 
That practice is still carried out in Bulgaria among Bosnian Turks.

Tim Loughton: My hon. Friend draws an important analogy. Was not Ovid exiled to the Black sea, supposedly for having an affair with the illegitimate daughter of the emperor Augustus, who would not have been able—

Jimmy Hood: Order. I ask hon. Members to keep within the scope of the amendment. I am being super-generous.

Henry Bellingham: We have had a brief excursion into the classics, which may have revealed that some Conservative Members might be better equipped for the modern age had they spent more time reading subjects such as mathematics and the sciences. On the other hand, we do have a knowledge of the classics.
 The amendment would bring about a symbolic reform. It would demonstrate total acceptance of adopted children at every level of society. I commend it to the Committee and look forward to its acceptance by the Parliamentary Secretary.

Julian Brazier: I shall be brief. My hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk made a parallel with the classical world at the end of his speech. There was almost a management principle involved in adoption law in Rome and Greece. Adoption was so much the norm in classical Rome that, according to Gibbon, there was not a single instance in all the centuries of the Roman empire of descent through blood relatives lasting for three generations. There were sometimes military coups, but in the majority of cases the emperor chose to adopt the worthy candidate as his son rather than to pass power on to his natural descendants.
 For all its faults, the edifice of the Roman empire was the most stable secular structure that the world has ever seen, lasting for about one and a half millennia, depending on when one considers it to have started and finished. We can learn from it. Choosing a person who was worthy if one was not satisfied of the suitability of one's blood offspring was the Roman approach.

Meg Munn: The hon. Gentleman referred to a ''person'' being worthy. In relation to the amendment, I am sure that we are talking about a worthy man.

Julian Brazier: Not always, no. I can remember at least one—

Jimmy Hood: Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not be tempted to digress.

Julian Brazier: The case I have in mind is that of the lady who inherited the titles of Attila the Hun, but I shall have to look it up. You are right to reproach me, Mr. Hood, but I mentioned that not because we all seek succession for the monarchy but because my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk makes a serious and worthy point. Many people who have reached the pinnacles of success have chosen to pass on not only their inheritance but their position among their followers. One example of a person adopted into a privileged family who went on to do huge amounts of good—he is still doing so, not least for my party—is Mr. Stuart Wheeler, whose actions were reported by the newspapers shortly before the election. His family passed on to him considerable wealth and position, and he had a privileged education. He has chosen to use his position in a number of philanthropic ways.
 The question that I want to ask the Committee is this. Would it not be a thoroughly good, symbolic measure if Parliament were to allow the provision to apply to peerages—they are still sought by many people for many reasons, although new ones are nearly always life peerages—as a way of saying that we are determined that adopted children at every level of society should be treated in exactly the same way as birth children?

Kevin Brennan: Further to the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Ms Munn), does the hon. Gentleman believe that an adopted son should take precedence over his older sister when the title is inherited? What he is exposing is not so much a shortcoming in the Bill that may need to be rectified, but shortcomings in the wider system. Those shortcomings, which create much unfairness, may need to be rectified in more wide-ranging legislation, and I am sure that we would welcome the hon. Gentleman's support for such legislation.

Julian Brazier: That issue goes well beyond the terms of clause 68, although it is a serious matter. There is a practical, albeit curious, difference between many Scottish titles and almost all English titles, but this Committee is not the right place to address that point, and I am sure that you, Mr. Hood, would restrain me if I did so.
 Most of the Bill, rightly, deals with adoption as it applies to the vast majority of children; but allowing one or two symbolic cases over the years, which is all we are talking about, will say something about every adopted child. I strongly believe in symbolic acts but I have always rejected symbolic gestures. Symbolism is fundamental to the way people live. The amendment proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk would say something engaging to every adopted child.

Jonathan Djanogly: Having heard my hon. Friends put across a competent argument—I have great admiration for their reforming zeal—and having heard Labour Members speak about the hereditary principle, I thought that a Conservative should make a case for the hereditary principle. My argument, which is that the hereditary principle is both hereditary and a principle, has been touched on. We may or may not like it, and I am sure that all hon. Members have a view, but that principle is based on blood ties—and on legitimacy. Whether or not that is regarded as correct in this day and age, it is the principle on which the hereditary system is based. Changing the principle would be a dangerous thing, for doing so would undermine the whole concept. Although fairness and advantages would be won for adopted children if they were included, it would not be consistent with the principle as it stands.
 My hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk asks where we go from here. Life peerages have been mentioned. The children of those who now receive life peerages receive the courtesy title; that should apply in future even if the child is adopted. In the same way, and using the same rationale, the same should apply to new hereditary peerages—I appreciate that not many are created—and adopted children should be included. In effect, we would be creating a new principle without destroying the existing one.

Rosie Winterton: The debate has been wide ranging. I am sure that the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk sincerely wants to right what he believes is a wrong affecting the rights of adopted children. However, as the debate has shown, the intention underpinning the amendments would have substantial implications for the wider law in that area—and for the rights of other children.
 Although I understand the motive behind the amendments, they will not achieve the consistency that the hon. Gentleman intends. As my hon. Friends have made clear in speeches and interventions, the amendments address the rights of adopted sons only. Daughters cannot usually inherit peerages and the amendment would not change that, whether or not the daughter was adopted.

Henry Bellingham: The Parliamentary Secretary is right, but some peerages have a special remainder, which allows the eldest daughter to inherit. In fact, quite a few Scottish titles have such an arrangement and a number of titles have been created with a special remainder for the daughter for one generation.
 One example is the Bass family, the famous brewing family from Burton. The first Lord Burton had only a daughter: she became Baroness Burton and her son became the second Lord Burton. The Parliamentary Secretary should bear such cases in mind. I have no difficulty with the rights of daughters being put on the same footing as those of sons. Our monarch is a female, and there are plenty of able female politicians on both sides—

Jimmy Hood: Order. The hon. Gentleman is making a rather long intervention.

Rosie Winterton: I am very aware that exceptions were made when peerages were created if there was no male heir. As the hon. Gentleman said, some ancient baronies by writ were created by remainders. Those include Willoughby de Eresby, Dacre, and Darcy de Knayth. The ancient Scottish earldoms of Mar and Sutherland and other peerages were also created by remainders which allowed females to inherit in default of male heirs, and the hon. Gentleman may already have referred to the Scottish earldoms of Loudoun and Dysart and the English baronies of Strange and Lucas of Crudwell. Females can, therefore, inherit some peerages.
 However, that goes slightly wide of the issue. The amendment would put adopted sons—I say that because we are dealing with sons in this case—in a more advantageous position than sons born to unmarried parents. A peerage cannot currently be inherited by a son who is born when his parents are unmarried. Even if they then marry and he is legitimated—that is apparently the correct word—he still cannot inherit.

Jonathan R Shaw: Born or conceived when his parents were unmarried?

Rosie Winterton: Born—no, both. I believe that the act—conception—must take place within the marriage.

Elfyn Llwyd: On a point of order, Mr. Hood. What does the Parliamentary Secretary mean by ''act''?

Jimmy Hood: Order. I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to carry on.

Rosie Winterton: I may be wrong on those points and need to correct myself. I would not like to mislead the Committee on such an important matter.

Tim Loughton: This might be one occasion on which a flow chart would be rather useful. Perhaps the Lord Chancellor's Department would care to provide one.

Rosie Winterton: That was extremely helpful. However, I stand corrected: the inheritance is allowed if the child is born into the marriage.

Jonathan Djanogly: If we accept the amendment, illegitimacy could be remedied by adoption.

Rosie Winterton: That may be possible, but it shows that the amendments would have a broad impact, which would create some difficulties. Peerages usually pass to the eldest son. I presume that the intention of the amendment is to ensure that the adopted son would inherit if he were older than any son born to the adopters. However, that could deprive the eldest natural son of what some might regard as his legitimate expectation.

Henry Bellingham: I mentioned the fourth Marquess of Aberdeen, who adopted a son in 1950. He went on to have natural children, and his eldest natural son is allowed to call himself the Earl of Haddo and will inherit. The Parliamentary Secretary spoke of depriving natural children, but we should be talking about the rights of adopted children and equality between adopted and natural children. The Government have a backward-looking attitude. We should be doing all we can to ensure that children adopted by loving couples, married or not, in every level of society are provided for.

Rosie Winterton: I chose my words carefully when I pointed out that the amendment could be regarded as depriving natural children of what some would regard as a legitimate expectation. I hope that that phrasing emphasises my opinion that the proposals would have wide implications.

Henry Bellingham: The Parliamentary Secretary talks about legitimate expectation, but I do not propose to make the provision retrospective. If the amendment were accepted, a natural son born after a child had been adopted would have no such expectation once the Bill became law. Legitimate expectations would not be relevant—they would, effect, go out of the window.

Rosie Winterton: If a peer's son were born and an older child subsequently adopted, the natural child might legitimately expect to inherit but be disinherited by the adoption of another child. That is hypothetical, and I would have to see how such a case stacked up against the amendment. The hon. Gentleman's suggestion could have many repercussions for adopted boys, who are the main subject of this discussion.
 A child born as a result of artificial insemination in which a third-party donor is involved cannot inherit.

Henry Bellingham: That is interesting. If a childless couple goes through IVF and the woman becomes pregnant, that is obviously a private matter for all concerned, and as long as the woman gets pregnant and has a healthy child, everything ends happily. Whether the outcome is achieved using donor sperm or artificial insemination seems irrelevant, because the child will, to all intents and purposes, be a natural child with all the rights of ordinary children. Is that not the case?

Rosie Winterton: There are much wider issues at stake. If a peer's wife undergoes artificial insemination involving a third-party donor, the child born as a result cannot inherit. However, I think I am right in saying that if the sperm is the peer's but the egg is donated by a third-party female, the peerage can be passed on because the male bloodline is preserved. There are inconsistencies in the approach taken, and the hon. Gentleman might be right in saying that there will be difficulties.

Tim Loughton: What if a peer of the realm donated sperm to a woman to whom he was not married? The Parliamentary Secretary said earlier that offspring would have to be legitimate if the title were to be passed on. Would the offspring resulting from such a donation be legitimated for the purposes of heredity if the peer donating the sperm later married the third-party woman?

Rosie Winterton: I think that if the peer who had donated the sperm married the woman before the child was born, the child would inherit the title, but if they did not marry and the child was not born into a married state, it would not be able to inherit. The principle would apply because the child would be considered illegitimate, and all the attendant difficulties of that status would come to bear.

Jonathan R Shaw: Given my hon. Friend's explanations, is it surprising that some hereditary families do not have the most stable existence?

Rosie Winterton: I do not know how much artificial insemination occurs among peers—it is clear that I have not been sufficiently well briefed on the subject.
 There are one or two difficulties with the amendments. Outwith their wider implications, from a purely legal, drafting perspective they do not achieve the intended effect. It appears that they would override any instrument granting the peerage and/or providing the inheritance, rather than establish the status of the adopted child for the purposes of such instruments. As I said, although I can understand the motivation behind the amendments, I must ask the Committee to reject them.

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for her explanation. The debate has been interesting and constructive and has introduced many issues that we never dreamed would be discussed.
 The Parliamentary Secretary referred to donor sperm and in vitro fertilisation. It is a shame that my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury is not here, as he and his wife have been through the process and he has spoken movingly about it. He knows the emotional stress and strain that couples undergo, as well as the total unfairness that they suffer because it is so difficult to get IVF treatment on the national health service. However, surely no differentiation as to how a child is born is made in respect of children born as a result of IVF, be it through intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection—ICSI—or other forms? Apart from the record kept by the clinic, no legal record will exist to show that a child was born as a result of donor sperm as opposed to the mother's egg being fertilised in a test tube by the father's sperm. Professor Craft or Professor Lord Winston, for example, might keep a record, but the children resulting from such treatment would not have an extra digit attached to their national insurance number. We do not live in a Stalinist state. One hopes that the child will be born into a happy, loving family. I am surprised by the Minister's remarks.

Rosie Winterton: I was trying to explain that that is how the law stands at the moment. Under the laws of inheritance, certain types of peerage pass down the male bloodline. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman was a Member of Parliament at the time, but the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 re-emphasised that inheritance could pass down only through the male's sperm.

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for putting me right on that point. I am sure that all members of the Committee know of families who have undergone IVF treatment, but they do not know what sort of treatment those families had. I submit that families with an inherited title may not know the nature of a child's conception because the treatment is a matter kept private between the couple and they do not broadcast the fact. Although the hospital and social services may be aware of what is happening, other people may not.

Rosie Winterton: Perhaps I can clarify a point. The hon. Gentleman said that the child might be born through IVF and asked whether that would become known. The current position is that an inheritance cannot be passed on unless it can be proved that the husband is the father.

Henry Bellingham: The Parliamentary Secretary seems to be saying that very few people would know about the childless couple's IVF treatment, which is a private matter. The stress and emotion for all involved is enormous, although it is of course hoped that in due course a child will be born into a loving family. The issue would be relevant only if someone contested the title—if perhaps 30, 40 or 50 or so years later a court case was brought. However, for all intents and purposes—and I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury will endorse this—such treatment is not something that people discuss except with their most intimate friends. In many happy cases, a child is born as a result of IVF, so it is a pity that many childless couples do not have access to fertility treatment on the NHS; perhaps the Minister of State, Department of Health, should take that point on board. The amendment has brought into sharp focus the concept of blood offspring, and how vague and dated it has become.

Julian Brazier: It is on record that my wife and I had IVF treatment, although our children are direct blood descendants of both of us. My hon. Friend raises an important issue, because the courts have ruled, for example in the case of Lord Ampthill, that no one can be forced against their will to undergo procedures such as DNA testing to ascertain who is genuinely blood offspring. Ludicrously, the current law is unenforceable.

Henry Bellingham: My hon. Friend illustrates the current state of affairs very well. Surely the time has come to get a grip on the matter. It would indeed be ironic if the Labour party emerged as the backwoodsmen, the supporters of something quite outmoded, outdated, archaic and divisive to society, who proved unwilling to take a highly symbolic step forward. I see some Labour Members who agree with me and would very much like to support the amendment.

Rosie Winterton: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that his amendments do not deal with the issues? They deal only with adopted sons.

Henry Bellingham: The Parliamentary Secretary makes a very good point and has explained that the two amendments would lead to difficulties. Although I put quite a lot of effort into the drafting, I obviously have not got it quite right. I thought that it was simpler and neater to leave out the word ''not'' and, as the Parliamentary Secretary knows, I am a great believer in keeping things simple and straightforward. However, she has argued convincingly that the amendments would not achieve what I intended. I accept her technical point that they would solve only part of the problem.
 In the hope that following discussion with fellow Ministers and perhaps with members of the Cabinet, including the Lord Chancellor, the Parliamentary Secretary will table an amendment on Report that would change the law as many of us want, or that her counterpart in another place will examine the matter and table new amendments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69 - Protection of trustees and personal representatives

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: Now that we have departed from the choppy waters of aristocratic sperm, it will be interesting to see how the Lords deal with those clauses. We are now on the safer—as far as the Hansard reporters are concerned—territory of trustees.
 I would like the Parliamentary Secretary to elucidate the clause. I speak with a vested, but non-pecuniary interest as someone who acts as a trustee for various funds. Subsection (1) exempts trustees from inquiring in the course of their duties, which would normally be to distribute the assets of a trust fund or administer the distribution of income, about the adoptive state of—I presume—a potential beneficiary of the trust. 
 I would like the Parliamentary Secretary to explain that. A trust may be set up with the explicit intention that its assets should be passed on only to blood relatives. For example, grandparents may set up a trust for their grandchildren, but they may want only the natural-born children of their children to inherit from it. If, after the grandparents' death, an additional child was adopted by the second generation and the trustees were unaware of that, could that adopted child be a beneficiary of the distribution of the trust's assets in the same way as the blood relatives? If it were later discovered by the trustees that they had effectively breached the terms of the trust because an adopted child had become a beneficiary, would there be no comeback on that? It would be useful to clarify that for trustees. I admit that it would be unusual for there to be exclusions or exemptions for adopted children in a trust's documents, but it is not inconceivable.

Rosie Winterton: Let me go back a bit. The idea of the clause, which replicates section 45 of the Adoption Act 1976, is to provide protection for trustees or personal representatives who might distribute property in ignorance of the making or revocation of an adoption order. It is not the same as the hon. Gentleman's example, but imagine that a will is made to distribute property among grandchildren, where the person who made the will dies and an adopted child then comes into the equation. If that will simply stated, ''All my grandchildren shall inherit a portion of my estate,'' the adopted grandchild would acquire the same rights as the other children. However, the trustees of the estate might distribute the money to the natural children and the adopted child without realising that the adoption order had been revoked because a mistake had been made or fraud had been committed in the documents. The clause covers such a situation. The hon. Gentleman would be protected if he were a trustee of an estate and mistakenly distributed money to the wrong children because he did not realise that the order had been revoked.

Tim Loughton: I think I see where the Parliamentary Secretary is coming from. However, will adoption law or trust law prevail? The trustees will not be guilty of wrongdoing because breaching a trust is not a criminal offence, although disaffected beneficiaries could bring a civil action. There is no comeback on the beneficiaries in trust law as regards the terms of a trust that specifies that non-adopted children can be the only beneficiaries.
 The previous clause dealt with inheriting property and the equal treatment of the children. After the trust is distributed among the children, it may transpire that one of them is adopted and should not, therefore, qualify under trust law. Which body of law takes precedence in such a case? The issue is slightly complicated, and the circumstances are highly hypothetical. Can natural-born beneficiaries sue so that the share of the trust that is erroneously paid out to the adopted child is handed back? I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary gets my point.

Rosie Winterton: I think that I get the hon. Gentleman's point, but I am not an expert on trust law, although I might become one—as if by magic. It is important to return to the terms of the trust and of any instrument that is drawn up.

Elfyn Llwyd: I hope that I can assist the Parliamentary Secretary. Subsection (2) gives the trustee immunity in civil and criminal law. Subsection (3) allows any disaffected person the right to the equitable remedy of tracing. That is the issue in a nutshell.

Rosie Winterton: I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman. That was almost what I was about to say. Any money that was incorrectly distributed would have to be handed back. The clause protects trustees who may distribute the estate in ignorance, although it would be an entirely different matter if they participated in an attempt to commit fraud. The clause is aimed at trustees who distribute money without realising that the adoption order has changed.
 The terms of any trustee document would prevail in terms of the inheritance. If a document stated that that the beneficiaries should be a specific number of children—perhaps named children—and left out the adopted children, that would be a different matter.

Henry Bellingham: I understand that the clause is intended to cover every eventuality, but surely a trustee or personal representative would know that a potential beneficiary had been adopted. Trustees have wide-ranging fiduciary duties. I should declare an interest, as I am one of several trustees of a trust with four or five beneficiaries. It is our job to ensure that the professional people investing in the funds and the solicitors running the trusts do so to a high standard. We are unpaid and act as trustees because we have respect for and like the family in question. It would be extraordinary beyond belief if I did not know all the circumstances affecting beneficiaries as part of my due diligence as a trustee. The clause surprises me.
 The clause may indeed cover every eventuality, as the Parliamentary Secretary says, but are there any other circumstances in which trustees or personal representatives would not be under such a duty? As part of trustees' due diligence requirement, it is their duty to be aware of such eventualities. In what circumstances does she imagine that trustees or personal representatives would not know about those unforeseen factors? 
 Finally, will the Parliamentary Secretary also tell us whether ''follow the property'', in subsection (3), is another legalistic definition of tracing, mentioned by the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd)?

Rosie Winterton: The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the clause applies to exceptional circumstances. I accept that he, as a trustee, has a large knowledge of the law, but the clause ensures that trustees do not have to undertake unduly extensive inquiries, which might be quite difficult in cases of fraud, for example, if a relative challenged an adoption. As I said, the provisions have been carried over from the 1976 Act to give trustees some protection, so trustees will not have to make unduly searching inquiries in exceptional cases such as fraud. In the personal case he has described, the hon. Gentleman obviously knows the family and their background well, but in some instances trustees are professionals who do not have intimate knowledge of the family. The answer to his question about tracing is yes.

Elfyn Llwyd: May I raise a matter that seems, on reflection, to be slightly odd? I understand subsection (3) with respect to tracing, but if the property is sold
''into the hands of another person'' 
under the clauses in question the disaffected person cannot recover at all. The trustee is immune—full stop. If the property is sold on in good faith, the disaffected person has, it seems to me, no right of action. Perhaps the Minister would reflect on that. I do not expect an immediate answer, but it would be interesting to know.

Rosie Winterton: I am extremely happy to reflect on that. Perhaps I could write to the hon. Gentleman and any other members of the Committee who would like to hear from me on that point.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70 - Meaning of disposition

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Henry Bellingham: I have a few questions. Any legal dictionary or textbook will give a definition of the term ''disposition'' very similar to that in the clause, but I want the Parliamentary Secretary to throw light on one or two points. Subsection (3) states:
 ''This Chapter applies to an oral disposition as if contained in an instrument made when the disposition was made.'' 
I hope that the hon. Lady will agree that that is quite clumsy drafting. There may be a technical reason for it. Presumably an oral disposition would have to mean one that was witnessed properly and legally, rather than just casually. 
 Another point about which I am not too clear is contained in subsection (4), which states: 
 ''The date of death of a testator is the date at which a will or codicil is to be regarded as made.''

Elfyn Llwyd: On the point about the clumsy wording of subsection (3), I suggest that it should be worded, ''This chapter applies to an oral disposition as if contained in a contemporaneous instrument.''

Henry Bellingham: That would be much neater, and 48 hours ago it would have been possible to table an amendment to that effect. However, the idea of a clause stand part debate is to enable us to bring to ministerial attention suggestions for improvement.
 As to subsection (4) I think that there is some confusion. Surely ''the date of death of a testator'' is the date on which he dies, unless I am being naive. Perhaps the Minister will correct me.

Rosie Winterton: I think that the clause is fairly uncontroversial, providing as it does a definition of the term ''disposition''. I assume that the reason for the provision stating that
 ''The date of death of a testator is the date at which a will or codicil is to be regarded as made.'' 
is that the will must be the last will. Is that not so?

Elfyn Llwyd: Let me assist the Parliamentary Secretary. The normal rule in law is that a will speaks from death. Therefore the clause is otiose.

Rosie Winterton: Then I am right in my interpretation that the wording is to confirm the normal legal position.
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman proceeded, pursuant to Sessional Order D [28 June] and the Order of the Committee [27 November], to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair. 
 Question agreed to. 
 Clause 70 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 The Chairman then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time. 
 Clauses 71 to 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Adjourned at twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock till this day at half-past Two o'clock.